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The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) is implicated in a broad range of behaviors and cognitive processes, but it
has been unclear what contribution, if any, the ACC makes to social behavior. We argue that anatomical and
functional evidence suggests that a specific sub-region of ACC—in the gyrus (ACCg)—plays a crucial role in
processing social information. We propose that the computational properties of the ACCg support a contri-
bution to social cognition by estimating howmotivated other individuals are and dynamically updating those
estimates when further evidence suggests they have been erroneous. Notably this model, based on vicarious
motivation and error processing, provides a unified account of neurophysiological and neuroimaging evi-
dence that the ACCg is sensitive to costs, benefits, and errors during social interactions. Furthermore, it
makes specific, testable predictions about a key mechanism that may underpin variability in socio-cognitive
abilities in health and disease.Introduction
Accounts of the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have highlighted
its role in fundamental cognitive processes, includingmotivation,
decision making, learning, cost-benefit calculation, as well as
conflict and error monitoring (Holroyd and McClure, 2015; Hol-
royd and Yeung, 2012; Rushworth et al., 2012; Kolling et al.,
2016; Laubach et al., 2015; Shackman et al., 2011; Shenhav
et al., 2013; Ullsperger et al., 2014; Verguts et al., 2015). While
such theories have dominated research on ACC, there is also
a long, if less influential, tradition associating ACC with social
behavior. For example, many years ago, links were drawn
between ACC and the basic affiliative and communicative be-
haviors in which all mammals engage (MacLean, 1993). That
link has persisted even as the neuroscientific approaches and
behavioral paradigms used to investigate social interaction
have increased dramatically in their sophistication (Saxe, 2006;
Schilbach et al., 2013; Somerville et al., 2006; Wang et al.,
2011; Haroush and Williams, 2015). It is apparent when neuroi-
maging is used to examine human brain activity when people
engage in socially orientedmodes of cognition, such as empathy
(Singer et al., 2004; Lamm et al., 2011), that might once have
been thought recalcitrant to neuroscientific examination. In addi-
tion, disorders of social cognition have long been linked to the
structure and function of the ACC (Apps et al., 2013b; Anderson
and Kiehl, 2012). Understanding the mechanistic contribution of
this region to social behavior is therefore vital for understanding
social cognition in health and disease.
It is sometimes assumed that any role ACC has in processing
social information simply reflects an aspect of more generalized
cognitive control processes. Here we review recent experi-
ments, primarily in primates such as macaques and humans,
to examine whether this is indeed the case. Drawing on anatom-
ical, lesion, single-unit recording, and neuroimaging studies, we692 Neuron 90, May 18, 2016 ª 2016 The Authors. Published by Else
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativesuggest that the notion that social information processing in the
ACC simply reflects general cognitive control processes can
be refuted. Anatomical evidence points to considerable hetero-
geneity in ACC cytoarchitecture and connectivity. Such hetero-
geneity is indicative of functions being localized to discrete
sub-regions.We highlight how evidence points to social informa-
tion being processed in a specific ACC sub-region in the gyrus
(ACCg). Both single-unit recording and neuroimaging studies
suggest that this region computes ‘‘other-oriented’’ information
(i.e., information about other agents that might be animals or
people, rather than ourselves; Apps et al., 2013b; Behrens
et al., 2009). We also review this region’s connectional and func-
tional properties in health and in disorders of social cognition
before finally describing a model of how this region might
compute information that guides our understanding of howmoti-
vated other people are. We suggest that this computational
framework has potential for providing mechanistic understand-
ing of variability in social behavior in healthy people and also dis-
orders of social cognition.
Using Social Information toGuide Learning andDecision
Making in ACC
Classical as well as recent accounts of the ACC have often
posited that this region plays a vital role in processing rewards
and also in decision making (Ullsperger et al., 2014; Kolling
et al., 2016). Recent work has highlighted that this region may
also be particularly important for evaluating cost-benefit infor-
mation that influences how motivated we are and foraging deci-
sions such as whether to maintain or switch behavior (Holroyd
and Yeung, 2012; Kolling et al., 2016). The ACC encodes vari-
ables determining the reward rate of a behavior, including its
probability of reward and its effortfulness, which are key determi-
nants of how vigorously behaviors should be pursued (Kennerleyvier Inc.
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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et al., 2012). On first glance it may therefore seem surprising to
suggest that this region is also particularly important for process-
ing information about others. However, from an ecological
perspective, it isn’t surprising at all. Despite major differences
in avian and mammalian neuroanatomy, in birds, species in
which foraging is sophisticated, information about the presence
of conspecifics is processed in adjacent regions to those con-
cerned with both the costs and benefits of the bird’s own
behavior (Aoki et al., 2006; Amita and Matsushima, 2014). More-
over, in humans, social information is processed in the same or
adjacent brain structures as those that are engaged during
foraging decisions, which may in part be because information
about competitors also crucially determines foraging decisions
(Mobbs et al., 2013). Such a confluence of information appears
to be a general principle of neural circuits for decision making.
Electrophysiological recordings in rodents suggest that neu-
rons in a homologous region to human ACC are concerned
with cost-benefit decisions made in social contexts and with
learning through observation of others. Hillman and Bilkey
(2012) recorded from the ACC as rats evaluated the costs and
benefits of competing with a conspecific for a reward. They
found that a large proportion of ACC neurons coded the net
value (benefit minus cost) of competing for a reward but did
not respond similarly to equal levels of reward when no compe-
tition was required. Lesions of the same ACC region (Cg1/Cg2) in
rats disrupt both cost-benefit decision making (Rudebeck et al.,
2006a) and diminish the normal interest they take in other rats
(Rudebeck et al., 2007). In mice, the typical ‘‘freezing’’ response
when receiving painful stimulation can also be learned by obser-
vation. Jeon and colleagues (2010) showed, however, that when
the ACC of mice is inactivated, they are no longer able to learn
the freezing response through observation. Inactivation of the
lateral amygdala did not abolish the ability to learn from observa-
tion in the same way. This would suggest that the ACCmay have
a particularly important role in learning about the behavior of
conspecifics in rodents as well cost-benefit information about
an animal’s own behavior.
Over the last decade many neuroimaging studies in humans
have shown that ACC is active when people interact with others
during economic games inwhich, typically, the experimental par-
ticipants make decisions that affect not only their own subse-
quent payoff but also the payoff that other players will receive
(Behrens et al., 2008; King-Casas et al., 2005; Gabay et al.,
2014; Sanfey et al., 2003; Tomlin et al., 2006; Ruff and Fehr,
2014). A recent study suggested that such responses in the
ACC may be driven by neurons that are predictive of the behav-
iors of another. Haroush and Williams (2015) recorded from the
ACC as monkeys performed a similar type of game to those
used in human neuroimaging studies—the prisoner’s dilemma
game. In this game, players have to choose between cooperating
with another or defecting—failing to cooperate. Cooperating re-
sulted in a medium-sized reward for the monkey but only if the
other cooperated too; the monkey only received a small reward
if it cooperated and the other defected. Defecting led to a large
reward payoff although, again, the payoff depended on what
the other did too. Not surprisingly ACC neurons responded to
the monkey’s own decisions of whether to cooperate or defectbut intriguingly they found a second class of neurons predicting
the decisions of the other monkey. Such findings suggest some
specificity for monitoring and predicting the behavior of others
within ACC. However, such experiments give rise to important
questions: (1) is such activity a corollary of the social interaction
that such tasks entail, or (2) is it simply the case that any difficult
decision making, whether it involves other people or not, is asso-
ciated with ACC activity? After all there are many reports linking
ACC to decisionmaking even in the absence of social context, so
at the heart of this Review is the question: is there anything spe-
cial about responses in the ACCwhen tracking others’ behavior?
If primate ACC activity tracks the behavior of others, then we
might expect ACC lesions to disrupt social behavior. It is indeed
the case that lesions in humans that impact on large areas of
medial prefrontal cortex, including portions of the ACC, result
in changes in social behavior, social decision making, and
the ability to learn from observation (Blair and Cipolotti, 2000;
Krajbich et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 1999; Moretti et al., 2009;
Kumaran et al., 2015; Hornak et al., 2003). However, the identity
of the key areas that, if damaged, cause social impairments has
been difficult to determine because the lesions are large and
directly affect several anatomical areas and undercut the con-
nections of even more. In macaques, circumscribed lesions to
the ACC, more so than some other frontal areas, disrupt the pro-
cessing of social information and lead to changes in social be-
haviors (Hadland et al., 2003; Rudebeck et al., 2006b, 2007;
Noonan et al., 2010). There is therefore evidence of a causal
link between social behavior and the ACC.
Taken together, research points to the ACC playing a key role
not just in reward-guided learning and decision making but also
in social cognition. However, to truly understand the ‘‘reference
frame’’ in which the ACC responds during social interactions and
to examine the specificity of any region for processing social in-
formation, it is important to use tasks where such features can
be disentangled. In the following sections, we consider some
simpler tasks that allow us to examine how ACC activity tracks
specific features of others’ behavior and the motivations that
inform those behaviors. First, however, we consider the anatomy
of the ACC in greater detail and examine whether some of its
component zones may have distinct functional properties.
The Anatomy of the ACC
Anatomical Dissociation between the Sulcus and Gyrus
The cingulate cortex in both humans andmonkeys contains mul-
tiple distinct cytoarchitectonic zones (Palomero-Gallagher et al.,
2008; Vogt, 2009) that imply localization of different functions to
each zone (Figure 1A). Although many discussions of ACC focus
on the anatomical distinctions that arise along the rostro-caudal
axis (Silvetti et al., 2014), an equally crucial cytoarchitectonic
distinction also exists in the dorsal-ventral dimension between
gyral and sulcal regions. Furthermore, differences in connec-
tional anatomy, related to the direction and strength of inter-
regional communications, suggest that the ACCg may be
functionally distinct from the more frequently studied regions in
the adjacent ACC sulcus (ACCs), often referred to as the dorsal
ACC (dACC). Notably, the distinction in anatomical properties
between the sulcus and gyrus extends across a large extent of
the ACC. In many atlases the ACCg contains areas 24a/b andNeuron 90, May 18, 2016 693
Figure 1. Anatomy of Cingulate Cortex
(A) Location of the different regions of the cingulate cortex in the macaque (left) and human (right) brain. Regions in blue comprise the ACC gyrus, red lie in the
sulcus (although they may also lie within the adjacent paracingulate gyrus and paracingulate sulcus when they are present). Note that these representative
drawings are based on a composite of cytoarchitectonic atlases of the cingulate. The border between areas 24a/b has no gross anatomical landmark and also
varies considerably between individuals (Vogt, 2009). Regions in green correspond to those typically referred to as dmPFC. Regions in dark blue are sometimes
referred to as part of the vmPFC. Image taken from Rushworth et al. (2004).
(B) Connectivity-based parcellation of themedial prefrontal cortex including ACCg (Neubert et al., 2015). The ACC gyrus regions 24a/b and 32pl are shown in light
green and maroon, respectively. A distinction between 24a/b and 24a’/b, proposed on the basis of cytoarchitectonic criteria by Vogt (2009) is not always
recognized. It was not possible to detect reliable differences between the connectivity profiles of these regions. The green box shows the resting connectivity
strength of area 24a/b to other brain areas in both the human (top left: lateral surface; bottom left: medial wall) and macaque (top right: lateral surface; bottom
right: medial wall) brain. The central spider plot shows the relative strength of connections between 24a/b and other brain areas in humans (red) and macaques
(blue). The maroon box shows the same information for area 32pl.
(C) A representative schematic of the connections of the ACCg. The arrows highlight the key systems the ACCg connects to and their putative roles in social
cognition. The ACCg (areas 24a/b and 32pl) is connected to a broad set of regions engaged in reward processing, decision making, and social information
processing, making it well placed to form part of a distributed network engaged in computing information about the reward-based behavior of others. Abbre-
viations: VTA, ventral tegmental area; hypoth, hypothalamus; hippoc, hippocampus; amygd/amy, amygdala; pallid, pallidum; Caud, caudate; ventrStr, ventral
striatum; temPol, temporal pole; rsplC, retrosplenial cortex; PCC, posterior cingulate cortex; pIPL, posterior inferior parietal lobule; pIPS, posterior intraparietal
sulcus; aIPS, anterior intraparietal sulcus; ParOP, parietal operculum; S1, primary somatosensory cortex; M1, primary motor cortex; SMA, supplementary motor
area; stria, striatum.
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predominantly in the ACCs (Figure 1A).
Throughout this Review, we use the terms ACCg and ACCs to
refer broadly to locations anterior to the posterior cingulate
cortex (PCC) in the gyrus and sulcus, respectively. We do this
because the location of the border between areas 32 and
24a/b has varied across anatomical studies (Walker, 1940; Pre-
uss and Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Carmichael and Price, 1994;694 Neuron 90, May 18, 2016Vogt, 2009) and it was not possible to carry out detailed histolog-
ical analysis of brain tissue in the humans and monkeys in the
experiments we discuss. Moreover, although not acknowledged
by every authority, there is evidence for cytoarchitectural subdi-
visionwithin area 24 (24a, a’, b, and b’; Vogt, 2009). However, the
anatomical connections of these subdivisions, which constrain
and determine function, appear broadly similar throughout
24a/24b (Van Hoesen et al., 1993). In fact many of the
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Van Hoesen et al., 1993; Beckmann et al., 2009; Neubert et al.,
2015). Patterns of activity coupling between these areas and
the rest of the brain, which only partly reflect monosynaptic
connections (O’Reilly et al., 2013), suggest important similarities
between human and macaque 24a/b, macaque area 32 and hu-
man area 32pl, and the manner in which they interact with the
rest of the brain in both species (Neubert et al., 2015; Figure 1B).
Importantly, it has also been argued, on the basis of cytoarch-
itectural analyses, that there is homology between human and
macaque ACC (Preuss and Goldman-Rakic, 1991; Vogt, 2009;
Vogt and Paxinos, 2014) and that the ACCs and ACCg differ
from one another in similar ways in the two species. This evi-
dence suggests that it may be possible to integrate findings
from lesion and neurophysiological studies in monkeys with
neuroimaging evidence in humans.
The ‘‘Social Connectivity’’ Profile of the ACCg
Humans live in large, complex social groups. It has been argued
that living in such large groups has led to evolutionary pressure
for larger brains in the primate order. As a result, it is often sug-
gested that there are networks in the brain that have evolved to
play important roles in social cognition and behavior (Dunbar and
Shultz, 2007; Passingham and Wise, 2012; Chang, 2013; Chang
et al., 2013b). Historically, neurobiological models of social
cognition have placed importance on three distributed neural
networks, each of which may perform different functions that
contribute to social behavior (Blair, 2013; Frith and Frith, 2006;
Kilner, 2011): (1) a ‘‘mentalizing’’ network involved in inferring
others’ mental states and abstract information about social situ-
ations, comprising a region in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ)
and the dorsal portions of the medial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC)
(Apps and Tsakiris, 2013; Frith and Frith, 2006; Hampton et al.,
2008; Lee, 2008; Lee and Seo, 2016); (2) an action observation
network (AON) including the ventral premotor cortex (PMv) and
adjacent BA44 and the anterior, inferior parietal cortex (Iacoboni
and Dapretto, 2006; Kilner, 2011); and (3) a network involved in
affective and value-based processing, including the amygdala,
ventral portions of the medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), and
anterior insula (AI) (Blair, 2013; Ruff and Fehr, 2014; Chang
et al., 2015; Fareri et al., 2015).
Although there are exceptions, the ACCg has classically not
been considered as a part of these networks. Nevertheless,
anatomical tracer studies in monkeys and neuroimaging studies
in humans examining human brain connections (Figures 1B and
1C) suggest that this region may in fact have strong connections
to each of these three social networks (Apps et al., 2013b; Beck-
mann et al., 2009; Mars et al., 2012; Mesulam andMufson, 1982;
Morecraft et al., 2012; Sallet et al., 2013; Vogt, 2009). This region
connects to the TPJ and the dmPFC, which are engaged in
mentalizing processes; to several amygdala nuclei, the vmPFC
and the AI regions, which are engaged during affective and social
processing; and also to the PMv and the inferior parietal cortex
regions engaged during action observation. This connectivity
profile places the ACCg as a potentially important region that
integrates a variety of distinct forms of social information from
the different social networks.
Is the connectivity profile of ACCg distinct from other cingulate
sub-regions? Notably, both tracer and resting-state studies inmacaques and humans highlight that its connectional fingerprint
is distinct from that of the adjacent cingulate regions (Beckmann
et al., 2009; Margulies et al., 2007). Specifically, none of the con-
nections from the ACCs overlap with those of the ACCg to the
mentalizing network or the AON and the connections of the
ACCg and the ACCs to the vmPFC and the amygdala also do
not fully overlap (Vogt, 2009; VanHoesen et al., 1993). This would
suggest that overall the ACCg has a connectivity profile that
plays an important role in processing social information, whereas
the ACCs may not have access to all of the same information.
Obviously not all ACCg’s connections are distinct from those
of the ACCs. The ACCg also interconnects with many regions
to which the ACCs does also. This includes strong interconnec-
tions between the ACCg and ACCs, between both regions and
several other portions of the prefrontal cortex, as well as parts
of the striatum, the parietal lobe, and both the ACCg and ACCs
receive monosynaptic input from dopamine neurons in the
ventral tegmental area (Vogt, 2009; Williams and Goldman-
Rakic, 1998). A diverse array of functions has been ascribed to
these regions. However, it is clear that they play important roles
in processing the costs and benefits of acting (Floresco et al.,
2008; Kolling et al., 2016; Rushworth et al., 2012; Verguts
et al., 2015). This would therefore suggest that while the ACCg
may be functionally distinct from the ACCs in terms of its role
in processing social information, it may also be sensitive to
some similar information. This may therefore highlight an impor-
tant role for the ACCg in processing the costs and benefits of
acting in social contexts, much how the ACCs does when eval-
uating the value of acting for ourselves (Kolling et al., 2016).
The ACCg and Social Cognition
A Functionally Distinct Region of the Cingulate Cortex
for Other-Oriented Information?
Lesion studies in macaques suggest that the region of the ACC
that is most important for the processing of social information
lies in the gyrus. Rudebeck and colleagues (2006b) showed
that lesions to the ACCg decreased the value that macaques
placed on social stimuli and also led to reductions in the execu-
tion of social behaviors. In contrast, lesions to the ACCs, and
other parts of the frontal cortex, do not lead to similar changes
to the valuation of social stimuli or social behavior, suggesting
a special role for ACCg in social cognition (Noonan et al.,
2010). Neuroimaging studies in primates provide further support
for the notion that the ACCg processes social information.
Resting-state connectivity in the ACCg has been shown to corre-
late with the size of social group in which macaques were living
(Sallet et al., 2011; Noonan et al., 2014).
Single-unit recording studies in macaques also suggest that
the ACCg processes other-regarding information that is particu-
larly important for social behavior, in a manner that is distinct
from other regions of the cingulate cortex. Chang et al. (2013a)
used a modified dictator game in monkeys, in which the actor
monkeys made a decision to share or withhold reward from
a conspecific or a decision to reward the conspecific or no
one (Figure 2). Using this design they were able to disentangle
whether neurons responded to rewarding outcomes being deliv-
ered to self, other, no one, or combinations of conditions. As well
as ACCs, they recorded from neurons in a relatively anteriorNeuron 90, May 18, 2016 695
Figure 2. Neurophysiological Recordings
from Macaque ACCs, ACCg and OFC as
Monkeys Performed a Modified Dictator
Game
The recipients of the reward could be self, other
monkey, or neither (Chang et al., 2013a).
(A) Left: recording sites on the medial wall, repre-
sented on a schematic of the different zones of the
ACC. ACCg recordings were taken from a region
that overlaps with both areas 24a/b and 32. Right:
recording regions on a coronal plane of an MR
image taken from Rushworth et al. (2004).
(B) Example neurons from the ACCs (top) and
ACCg (bottom). Shown are spiking activity profiles
after monkeys made a reward allocation decision
(aligned to Choice, left) and after the outcome was
actually received (aligned to Reward, right). The
ACCs neuron responded to ‘‘other’’ and ‘‘neither’’
after a choice and at the time the reward was
delivered. By contrast, the ACCg neuron re-
sponded only to other reward and not to self or
neither both at the time of choice and the receipt of
the reward.
(C) Proportion of neurons out of all neurons with
a significant modulation to any decision or reward
outcome that showed one of three potential
reference frames. ‘‘Self- referenced’’ (red) neurons
responded to rewarding outcomes referenced to
self (whether self-received a reward or not) but did
not distinguish between other or neither. These
neurons could signal either received (predomi-
nantly in OFC) or foregone (predominantly in ACCs)
reward for self. In blue are neurons that signaled
reward for other only, and in purple are neurons
that signaled reward for both self and other in a
similar manner (but not to neither reward). The
ACCg showed a significantly higher proportion of
other-referenced and both-referenced neurons
than either the ACCs or OFC, in which the majority
of neurons were self-referenced.
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32 (Figures 2A and 2B). They found that a significantly higher pro-
portion of neurons in the ACCg responded to rewarding out-
comes delivered to another, with many responding exclusively
when another monkey was receiving a reward. Specifically,
they found that approximately 60% of neurons that responded
to any choice, cue, or reward outcome (approximately 25% of
total neurons recorded) in the ACCg (Figure 2C) signaled when
another monkey was receiving a reward (whether exclusively
for another monkey [other-referenced] or in a mirrored fashion
when either self or other obtained a reward [both-referenced]).
Nearly half of these reward-sensitive neurons in ACCg only re-
sponded to the other monkey’s reward. While 25% may seem
a small proportion of neurons, it is comparable with the pro-
portion of neurons in the premotor cortex exhibiting ‘‘mirror
neuron’’-like profiles and yet such PMv neurons putatively influ-696 Neuron 90, May 18, 2016ence behavior (Kilner and Lemon, 2013)
and impact on electromyographic activity
at several synapses distance (Catmur
et al., 2011). In contrast, approximately
70% of reward-modulated neurons in
the ACCs and 80% in the OFC were
self-referenced and did not respond toany information about other monkeys. Thus, the proportion of
neurons in the ACCg sensitive to other’s reward outcome,
including those that exclusively use an other-oriented frame of
reference, is striking and distinctive. This finding would therefore
suggest that, compared to the ACCs and other cortical regions,
the ACCg may play a more significant role in processing ‘‘other-
oriented’’ information.
Is there a similar specialization for other-regarding information
in the ACCg in the human brain? Recently, a number of studies
have askedwhether ACCgprocesses self or other-oriented infor-
mation. With a striking consistency, they have localized an ACCg
region near area 24a/b that only responds to other-oriented infor-
mation (Figure 3A). Crucially, all of these studies have highlighted
that ACCg processes cues that are informative as to what events
will impact another person even if it does not always process
cues informative of events that will impact upon ourselves.
Figure 3. ACCg Responses to Other-Oriented Information in fMRI Studies
(A) Results from fMRI studies in humans that have compared the processing of similar information for self and other. In these studies, activity was present for
others’ high versus low reward probability (Lockwood et al., 2015; top left), the net-value (reward-effort) of another’s actions but not one’s own (Apps and
Ramnani, 2014; bottom left), responses to others’ high pain more than low pain (from the meta-analysis of Lamm et al., 2011; top right), and others’ prediction
error (Apps et al., 2015a). The central panel shows the locations of the ACC gyrus (blue) and ACC sulcus (red). Strikingly, these results all appear to fall in the same
region the ACCg.
(B) The response of the ACCg to others’ prediction errors when the subject monitored another’s actions. The graph shows the peristimulus time histogram plot of
the BOLD response following trials in which the other person would have a positive PE (light green triangles) or a negative PE (dark green circles).
(C) Response in the ACCg at the time of the outcome of decisions during a strategic social interaction task covarying with a PE updating beliefs about how the
valuations of another will change (Zhu et al., 2012). The right panel shows that the extent to which this region signaled a PE (i.e., the parameter estimates for the
covariation with the BOLD response) correlated with the degree to which subjects’ decisions were influenced by the other person.
(D) Activity in the ACCg (red) to the outcomes of another’s advice or the outcomes of one’s own decisions (green) during a social interaction task inwhich a subject
learned either from their own outcomes but also received advice from another. The right panel shows that the variability in the ACCg response at the time of the
outcome of each action to how ‘‘volatile’’ the advice of another was, correlated with how influenced subjects’ behavior was by the advice of the other person.
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of others’ reward (Apps and Ramnani, 2014; Lockwood et al.,
2015; Figures 2A and 2B) or provide information about whether
rewardingoutcomesarebeingdeliveredduringsocial interactions
(Apps et al., 2012, 2013a; Behrens et al., 2008; Zhu et al., 2012;
Figures 3C and 3D) or when subjects process stimuli that are pre-
dictive of painful stimulation being delivered to another person
(Lockwood et al., 2013; Lamm et al., 2011; Figure 2A). However,
the ACCg is not activated by similar cues indicating that the sub-
ject themselves will receive painful stimulation or a reward. In
addition, a study by Apps and colleagues (2013a) examined
activity in the ACCg when processing the outcomes of either an-
other’s decisions or the responses of a computer. Crucially, they
found that the ACCg—albeit in a slightly more posterior region
from the other neuroimaging and neurophysiological recording
studies—responded to the outcomes of the other person’s deci-
sions but not to the outcomes of a computer’s responses. Taken
together, neurophysiological and neuroimaging evidence reveals
that the ACCg responds to other-oriented information but not to
information about ourselves or about non-biological agents.The ACCg and the Motivational Value of Behavior for
Another
As highlighted in the previous section, there is accumulating
evidence that the ACCg processes other-oriented information.
Although teasing apart signals that are related to decisions,
predictions, or outcomes can be challenging (Cai and Padoa-
Schioppa, 2012), in the this section we review evidence that sug-
gests that the ACCg may play an important role in processing
cues that allow for predictions about cost-benefit evaluations
to be made about the value of a behavior for another.
In the study by Chang et al. (2013a), not only did the ACCg ac-
tivity reflect reward delivered to others, but it also, at earlier time
points in each trial, reflected the monkeys’ expectations about
the reward about to be received by the other. Specifically, the
normalized response profile of ACCg neurons reflected reward
that the other monkey would receive prior to their delivery, but
it did not change when rewards were to be delivered to no one
or just to the self (Figure 2B). Therefore, ACCg activity reflects
predictions about the motivated state of a conspecific prior to
the actual reward delivery.Neuron 90, May 18, 2016 697
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tivity is found exclusively for cues that are predictive of reward for
others. Lockwood et al. (2015) examined activity at the time of
cues that was predictive of a high probability or a low probability
of a reward for the subject or for another person. Crucially, they
found that activity in the ACCg was sensitive only to the proba-
bility of another receiving a reward.
Some neural circuits are not just sensitive to primary reward
but they are also sensitive to other factors that determine the
net value of a course of action, such as costs entailed by the
actionmade to obtain reward. This certainly is the case for cingu-
late regions concerned with reward-guided decision making
even in the absence of social context (Rudebeck et al., 2006a;
Kennerley et al., 2009; Kolling et al., 2016), but is it also true of
the ACCg? Apps and Ramnani (2014) used fMRI to examine ac-
tivity at the time of cues that indicated whether the subject or
another person would have to exert effort to obtain a reward
(Figure 3A). They found ACCg activity covaried with net value
(reward – effort) at the time of the cues, but only on trials when
the other person would have to exert the effort to obtain the
reward. Such an activity pattern is analogous to that seen in
the ACCs in non-social reward-guided decision making (Kolling
et al., 2016). Other studies have also reported activity in the
ACCg at times when predictions can be made about the value
of a behavior for another (Boorman et al., 2013; Jones et al.,
2011). Importantly, this includes studies in which subjects are
evaluating reward that will be received by others that are delayed
in terms of their receipt–another key factor that devalues rewards
(Nicolle et al., 2012).
How does ACCg activity manifest when there is a possibility
of a net negative state for another individual? If the ACCg is truly
signaling value, then its activity should decline even further in
such situation, but if instead the ACCg is signaling the net moti-
vational impact of another person’s state, then its activity will
increase as the net negative impact increases (cf. Roesch and
Olson, 2007). ACCg activity conforms with the latter pattern; it
encodesmotivational salience; cues indicative of affective states
closely linked to motivation, such as fearful faces or pictures of
others in pain, also increase activity in the ACCg in the same
manner as rewarding stimuli (Rotge et al., 2015; Lockwood
et al., 2013; Molenberghs et al., 2012). But, as highlighted above,
activity in this region shows an opposing profile in terms of being
sensitive to the costs of others’ actions.
This profile suggests that at the time of cues that are predictive
of behavior by another, activity increases in the ACCg when
the benefit associated with the behavior is greater and actions
will be more motivated (invigorated). The prospect of negative
states as well as positive ones can lead to similar motivation
or invigoration and it is with this motivational factor that ACCg
activity covaries. That is, activity increases when another will
avoid pain or obtain a reward. However, activity in this region
also decreases with costs that decrease motivation, such as
the effort costs or temporal delay before a beneficial outcome
is received. This suggests that the ACCg is signaling the motiva-
tional value of acting for another.
The ACCg and the Outcomes of Others’ Behavior
While many studies suggest that the ACCg responds to stimuli
that are predictive of events that impact another, the ACCg698 Neuron 90, May 18, 2016also appears to be sensitive to the outcomes of decisions that
impact upon another. A large number of EEG and fMRI studies
have shown during social interaction tasks that the ACCg signals
when the outcomes of others’ actions are unexpected (Koban
et al., 2010; Shane et al., 2008). As highlighted above, Chang
et al. (2013a) identified that a group of reward-sensitive neurons
in the macaque ACCg signal only when reward will be delivered
to another and not to no one or ourselves. In humans, Behrens
and colleagues (2008) asked participants to make decisions on
the basis both of the history of reward that they had experienced
with different choices, and also on the basis of advice that they
were given. When the participants were given feedback at
the end of the each trial, they were able to update both their
estimates of action values and their estimates of how good the
advisor was. The weight of influence, or impact, of the feedback
information on these two updates was associated with activity
change in the ACCs and ACCg, respectively; the activity in-
creases were, respectively, proportional to the action learning
rate parameter size and the advisor learning rate parameter
size in the model used by Behrens and colleagues. This would
point, therefore, to the ACCg playing an important role in
other-oriented learning—learning about the behavior of others,
and perhaps also, to learning about the value other’s place on
behavior.
Other studies suggest that not only does the ACCg signal
information at the time that outcomes are delivered to other peo-
ple, but it signals when other people’s expectations about the
consequences of their actions are revealed as erroneous. Such
signals are typically referred to as prediction errors (PEs), a signal
for tracking the statistical properties of the environment (Schultz,
2006). In the ACCg, the statistical properties of the contingencies
between stimuli and rewarding outcomes for others are tracked
by PEs. As reported above, Apps et al. (2013a) found that the
ACCgwas active when the outcomes of another’s actions are re-
vealed to a subject. Specifically, they showed that ACCg activity
signaled when the outcome of another’s action was discrepant
from the predicted outcome. However, it signaled this PE only
for the unexpected outcomes of another’s action and not for
the outcomes of a computer. ACCg activity has also been found
to covary with PEs when monitoring the outcomes of another’s
strategy (Zhu et al., 2012) as well as when updating beliefs about
other people’s strategies (Hampton et al., 2008). Crucially, all
of these studies point to the ACCg being engaged when moni-
toring others’ outcomes and suggest that this region may signal
‘‘outcome’’-related PEs (OPEs).
The ACCg and Monitoring Others’ Actions
Recent evidence suggests that the ACCgmay also signal predic-
tion errors (PEs) while we monitor the actions of another person,
not only when viewing the outcomes of their actions. Apps et al.
(2015a) asked subjects to act like a teacher and monitor the
actions of another person (student) engaged in learning stim-
ulus-response associations by trial and error (Figure 3B). As
the subjects had learned all of these associations themselves,
when they saw the action of the other person they could infer a
PE for how different another’s prediction was from the actual
outcome the subject knew they would receive. They found
activity in the ACCg signaled this PE (Apps et al., 2015a). In
other studies, the ACCg was found to respond more strongly
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kinematics (Casile et al., 2010; Maffei et al., 2015). It could be
postulated that such a response in the ACCg might reflect the
signaling of a discrepancy between the expected and actual
kinematics of another’s action. That is, the ACCg may signal a
PE when monitoring another’s movement, coding for the differ-
ence between an expectation about the value of a movement
for another and the actual value of the movement executed.
Domain Generality in the ACCs
In contrast to the ACCg, the adjacent ACCs (or dACCas it is often
called) does not seem to have such a specialization for other-
oriented information. Based on single-unit recordings, lesion
studies, and neuroimaging approaches (see Silvetti et al., 2014
or Kolling et al., 2016 for reviews), the ACCs, including its anterior
perigenual portion, signals the value of our own behavior (Ame-
mori and Graybiel, 2012), and updates those estimates when
feedback suggests that they may have been incorrect (Procyk
et al., 2016). As a result of these findings, many attempts have
been made to develop domain-general models of the contribu-
tionsof this region tocognitiveprocessing (Alexander andBrown,
2011; Holroyd and McClure, 2015; Holroyd and Yeung, 2012;
Silvetti et al., 2014; Verguts et al., 2015).
In studies directly investigating social information processing,
there is mixed evidence as to how important a role the ACCs
plays in processing social information. In human neuroimaging
studies, the ACCs is activated when painful stimulation is deliv-
ered to either ourselves or other people. However, it also re-
sponds to the unexpected outcomes of both other people and
computers (Apps et al., 2013a). This suggests that ACCs pro-
cesses information regardless of whether it pertains to another
biological agent or not. In Chang and colleagues (2013a), a study
discussed in the preceding sections, the vast majority of ACCs
neurons differentiated between reward delivered to self and
other but the same neurons also similarly differentiated between
conditions in which the self or no one obtained a reward. In fact,
within the ACCs very few neurons distinguished between reward
delivered to the other or to no one (Figure 2B). This would sug-
gest that neurons in this region predominantly respond to ‘‘fore-
gone’’ reward. That is, these neurons code for when a reward is
not going to be delivered to ourselves. This would place these
neurons within a ‘‘self’’ reference frame and not an ‘‘other’’ frame
of reference.
Incontrast, recent studies recording from theACCsduringmore
complex social interaction tasks could be interpreted as suggest-
ing that neurons in this region signal other-oriented information.
Yoshida et al. (2012) found neurons in the ACCs that responded
when another monkeymade an error during a reward incentivized
action selection task. While this could be interpreted as reflecting
‘‘other-oriented’’ information, it is important to note that the
subject’s own outcome and subsequent behavior was critically
dependent on the action selection of the other monkey. A failure
of the other monkey to act appropriately would therefore lead to
an absence of reward for the monkey themselves. Thus, this
finding is remarkably consistent with that of Chang et al. (2013a),
who showed that the majority of responses in the ACCs reflect a
‘‘foregone’’ reward for ourselves in a self-referenced manner.
In another study, Haroush and Williams (2015) recorded from
neurons in ACCs as monkeys played the prisoner’s dilemmagame with another monkey. They found neurons that were pre-
dictive of the other monkeys’ choices of whether to cooperate
in the iterative game. While these signals may be interpreted
as reflecting the other-oriented process, it is also equally plau-
sible that these signals may be self-referenced. With differential
probabilities of the monkey themselves receiving a reward
depending on the history of choices of the two monkeys, these
neurons could be reflecting a prediction of a foregone reward
as in Chang et al. (2013a). These neurons may therefore reflect
the updating of the first monkey’s decision-making strategy on
the basis of the other’s previous actions, which is critical for
social interactions.
While this notion of domain generality might suggest that the
ACCs has limited specialization for social information process-
ing, it is important to consider the connections highlighted in pre-
vious sections between the ACCg and other areas of the brain.
As noted, the ACCg has strong connections to the OFC, ventral
striatum, and ACCs. Without doubt, these regions are important
for guiding behavior, including social interactions (Azzi et al.,
2012; Burke et al., 2010;Watson and Platt, 2012). However, neu-
roimaging and neurophysiological evidence suggests that they
may not process information in the same reference frame as
ACCg (Lee and Seo, 2016; Chang et al., 2013a; Azzi et al.,
2012; Ba´ez-Mendoza et al., 2013). Moreover, the ACCg is also
connected to portions of the dmPFC and TPJ that have been
shown to signal ‘‘other-oriented’’ information in a variety of
different tasks (see Lee and Seo, 2016 for a review). This there-
fore places the ACCgwithin a distributed network that guides so-
cial behavior, with the ACCg processing information about the
level of motivation of others agents during social interactions.
The ACCg and Variability in Social Behavior
Social abilities vary considerably even between healthy individ-
uals (Bird and Viding, 2014). Notably, the structural and func-
tional properties of the ACCg have been linked to variability in
both social behavior and factors that influence socio-cognitive
abilities.
As highlighted above, the connectivity of the ACCg has
been shown to reflect social group size (Sallet et al., 2011)
(Figure 4A). There is also evidence that activity in the ACCg
in response to other-oriented information—and particularly to
stimuli that carry information about the motivational value of
behavior for another—varies with trait levels of social abilities.
Levels of our ability to empathize with others have been shown
to be correlated with activity in the ACCg when processing infor-
mation about pain being delivered to others (Lamm et al., 2011)
or cues that are instructive of the probability of another receiving
a reward (Lockwood et al., 2015) (Figure 4B).
There is also evidence that variability in the ACCg response is
linked to social behavior during tasks in which people interact.
Specifically, the extent to which activity in the ACCg responded
to feedback about the advice of another is related to variability
in the degree to which people are influenced by that advice
(Behrens et al., 2008; Figure 3C). In addition, the extent to
which ACCg signals information at the time of the outcomes of
others’ actions, and particularly the degree to which this region
signals PEs, correlates with how influenced by others’ behavior
people are during competitive interactions (Zhu et al., 2012;
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Figure 4. Variability and Pathology in ACCg Activity to Other-Oriented Information
(A) Resting-state activity in the macaque ACCg (left) correlates with social network size (right; x axis: size of social group, y axis: strength of resting-state
connectivity between ACCg and TPJ/STS) (Sallet et al., 2011).
(B) The extent to which the ACCg (left) exclusively processes the expected value of others’ reward correlates with self-reported levels of emotion contagion
(a component of empathy). The graph to the right shows the extent to which the ACCg signaled an interaction between probability of reward and agent identity
(self versus other). In this graph, the interaction term (BOLD response) correlated with emotion contagion (trait empathy, x axis). Higher levels of empathy were
related to greater specialization of the ACCg for processing others’ reward and not subjects’ own reward (Lockwood et al., 2015).
(C) Differences in ACC activity between healthy controls and a high-functioning ASD group during a social interaction task (Chiu et al., 2008). Patterns of activity in
controls and ASD (left) were different at a moment in time when subjects could predict the consequences of their actions on the reward that would be obtained by
another. The response of the cingulate at that moment in time, correlated with ASD symptom severity (right).
(D) Activity in the ACC to the pain of others (pictures of others’ in pain: y axis) is negatively correlated with callous (psychopathic/ICU-callous traits) traits (x axis) in
children with conduct problems (Lockwood et al., 2013). Although responses in (C) and (D) were not localized specifically to the sulcus or gyrus, they do provide
evidence that links together ACC and impairments in social behavior.
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the ACCg in the typical population is predominantly ‘‘other-ori-
ented,’’ the degree to which the ACCg processes information
in this reference frame varies between individuals. As a result,
there is considerable variability in the response of the ACCg to
predictions about the value of a behavior for another and also
to the extent to which PEs update our predictions about other
people. These studies point to individual differences in the
response of the ACCg or the degree to which the response is
in an other-oriented frame of reference (Chang et al., 2013b)
being closely linked to variability in the ability to understand
the value of a behavior for another individual.
Disorders of Social Cognition and the ACCg
In clinically diagnosed psychopathy and ASD, there is also evi-
dence of disruptions to the structural and functional properties
of the ACCg. Post-mortem evidence has highlighted changes in
the histological properties of the ACCg and ACCs as one of the
most replicable differences between the brains of individuals
with ASDandhealthy control individuals (Zikopoulos andBarbas,
2013). Resting connectivity of an area including the ACCg and
also ACCs has also been shown to be different in a large sample
of individuals with ASD compared to a matched control group
(Balsters et al., 2016). It has also been shown that symptom700 Neuron 90, May 18, 2016severity in ASD is correlated with activity in the ACC during an
economic exchange with another (Chiu et al., 2008; Figure 4C).
In addition, psychopathic individuals and children who are rated
as highly callous show differences in gray matter volume in the
ACCg and connectivity between this region and other regions
involved in processing social information such as the AI and the
AON (Bird and Viding, 2014; Blair, 2013; Ly et al., 2012).
Existing evidence suggests that the functional properties
disrupted in theACCg in thesedisordersmaybe linked to thepro-
cessingof information about thepain another is receiving.Activity
in theACCg to thepainof others hasbeenshown tobeattenuated
in psychopathic individuals and those who exhibit callous traits
(Anderson and Kiehl, 2012; Carre´ et al., 2013; Lockwood et al.,
2013; Figure 4D). Similarly, the response of the ACCg to stimuli
that indicate another is in pain is reduced in ASD compared to
healthy controls (Fan et al., 2014). Prominent theories of ASD
have also argued that deficits in social behavior may arise from
the inability to effectively process motivation related information
during social interactions (Chevallier et al., 2012).
There is therefore evidence to suggest that the ACCgmay be a
key region that is disrupted across different disorders of social
cognition. Moreover, the deficit in the ACCg appears to be spe-
cifically tied to the processing of ‘‘other-oriented,’’ motivationally
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investigations of the ACCg in disorders of social cognition, these
results suggest that this regionmay be a fruitful target to examine
in disorders of social cognition.
Motivation and Vicarious Error Model: A Computational
Framework of ACCg Contributions to Social Cognition
In the previous sections, we have highlighted how the ACCgmay
be the key region of the ACC that processes information in
an ‘‘other-oriented’’ reference frame. Disruption to this region
changes social behavior, a group of specialized neurons in this
region respond to others’ reward, the region signals when infor-
mation learned specifically about others is unexpected, and vari-
ability in this region is related to variability in social behavior.
However, to date, there has been an absence of a theoretical
framework that can inform future basic or clinical research.
Moreover, while studies have hinted at the computational mech-
anisms that may operate within this region, this has never been
formalized in a generalized manner that could characterize vari-
ability in behavioral or neural signals across a variety of tasks.
This is in stark contrast to generalized models of dACC/ACCs,
of which theoretical accounts are numerous and classical ac-
counts suggest that the ACCs may be important for conflict
monitoring, error detection, learning, and decision making (Alex-
ander and Brown, 2011; Rushworth et al., 2012; Holroyd and
Yeung, 2012; Shenhav et al., 2013; Ullsperger et al., 2014; Hol-
royd and McClure, 2015; Verguts et al., 2015; Kolling et al.,
2016). Here, we suggest that the ACCg shares some of the
computational properties of the ACCs but processes this infor-
mation in an other-oriented frame of reference. In this next
section, based on the extant literature and relevant research
on the computations that underlie value-based motivation, we
put forward a model that may be useful in explaining the previ-
ously identified contribution of the ACCg to processing informa-
tion about others.
Understanding Others’ Motivation: A Key Social Process
In order to successfully interact with others, an agent must
monitor the behavior of other individuals closely in order to pre-
dict the behaviors that they are likely to produce next and
respond in the most adaptive manner (Adolphs, 2003; Brent
et al., 2014; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Frith and Frith, 2006).
Crucially, to do so, an agent needsalso to estimate themotivation
of others. Accurately processing the level of motivation another
has to obtain a desirable outcome (i.e., vicariously processing
the value of a behavior for another individual) is a fundamental
ability that is distinct frommany other more frequently discussed
components of social cognition (e.g., theory ofmind, perspective
taking, or empathizing) (Frith and Frith, 2006; Bird and Viding,
2014). For example, when I see someone running fast, this tells
me that they are highly motivated at that moment in time. The
vigor (speed) of their behavior therefore informs how motivated
they are. However, it does not necessarily provide information
on what their mental state is, nor is it necessarily informative as
to their current mood. That is, we are able to infer whether some-
one is highly motivated or not, but their level of motivation can be
orthogonal to the inferenceswecanmake about their cognitive or
affective state. Tracking another’s motivation may therefore be a
key, but often neglected, component of social cognition.The level ofmotivation or vigor in another’s behavior can there-
fore be thought of as a key piece of information that must be
tracked during social interactions. Importantly, it can also be
quantified. Anything that increases vigor can be thought of as
motivating behavior toward a beneficial outcome that is being
sought (e.g., obtaining a reward or avoiding pain), and anything
that decreases vigor when there is a highly beneficial outcome
offered can be thought of as a cost. This can be quantified
as a ‘‘value’’ signal, with the benefits of moving fast traded off
against the costs (Manohar et al., 2015). As argued in previous
sections, we suggest that ACCg is sensitive to factors deter-
mining the motivation of others (their costs and benefits). There
is little evidence that many other brain regions signal as much in-
formation about the reward or pain that is, ormay be, received by
another apart from perhaps the AI, a region to which the ACCg is
strongly connected (Lamm et al., 2011; Mesulam and Mufson,
1982). This includes frontal lobe regions linked to reward-guided
decision making, such as vmPFC and ACCs, and other brain re-
gions such as TPJ and dmPFC linked to other aspects of social
cognition andmeta-representation (Chang et al., 2013a; Lee and
Seo, 2016).
Vicarious Motivation: The Value of Behavior for Another
We break vicarious motivation (Figure 5) processing down into
the three distinct phases. (1) We must infer and represent the
expectations another has about the value of their own behavior
in terms of the beneficial outcome they desire for themselves,
and the costs they will incur to obtain the outcome. This vicar-
ious value (Vv) can either be derived from exogenous cues
from the environment that have been learned to be predictive
of costs and benefits for others, from communication directly,
or from cues such as facial expressions. (2) The Vv ascribed
to others’ behaviors are updated dynamically, online during
the monitoring of their actions; and (3) the value of cues associ-
ated with such behaviors are updated when a subsequent
outcome reveals that the initial expectation at the time of a
cue was erroneous (i.e., when we learn that the value of a partic-
ular cue for another is different from what we had expected). In
this section, we outline how a model derived from computa-
tional accounts of value processing and motor control may be
useful for quantifying the mechanisms underlying the vicarious
processing of motivation. From henceforth, we refer to this
computational framework as the Motivation and Vicarious Error
model (MoVE).
As noted in previous sections, the ACCg appears to process
information that increases the value of acting (e.g., avoiding
pain or approaching reward) and also that which decreases
value (e.g., effort or delays). Computationally, we therefore char-
acterize a prediction of how motivated another is as processing
the vicarious value (Vv) of an action they will perform. This Vv is
dependent upon the magnitude of the benefit (R) for another in-
dividual. This benefit can be thought of as being always posi-
tively valenced or unsigned (i.e., regardless of the positive or
negative valence of the outcome, the Vv increases with the
magnitude of the outcome such as greater pain or reward). So
avoiding a large loss, obtaining a large reward, or avoiding a sig-
nificant amount of pain would all reflect a large benefit for
another person and thus increase ‘‘value.’’ The benefit magni-
tude is devalued by three distinct costs: (1) the temporal delayNeuron 90, May 18, 2016 701
Figure 5. The MoVE Model
(A) Prior to another’s movement, the value of a
behavior for another individual can be estimated.
From this it is possible to compute how motivated
a specific individual will be following a specific cue
associated with a particular behavior pattern. That
is, an observer can weigh up the costs and benefits
of a behavior for a specific other individual and
vicariously estimate the expected ‘‘value’’ of a
behavior for that individual (Vv). The benefit (Rv) for
another reflects the motivational benefit of acting.
Thus, value increases if the magnitude of a reward
is higher, but also if magnitude of painful stimula-
tion will be greater. Thus, the magnitude (salience)
of the potential outcome, regardless of its valence,
increases ‘‘value’’ in this model. The magnitude
of the benefit is temporally discounted (kD), by
the probability of the behavior succeeding (P) and
weighed against the effort cost of exerting the
action (fE).
(B) These estimates are updated by two different
categories of prediction error (PE). Vicarious
outcome prediction errors (vOPEs) update ex-
pectations about the value of a behavior for
another based on the presence or absence of a
beneficial outcome (i.e., Rv, D, or P are updated);
vicarious dynamic PEs (vDPEs), errors in the esti-
mation of another’s motivation based on their
movement kinematics and also update estimates
of the motivation of another. These error signals
can update the parameter estimates for another
agent (i.e., K, q, andf), althoughwe note that these
idiosyncratic motivational parameters are not
‘‘stored’’ in the ACC, they influence estimates of
howmotivated a specific other individual may be. As a result, estimates of themotivation of another agent are updated by inferences about the internal states that
guide another’s behavior.
(C) There are multiple possible ways in which under- or over-estimation of parameters relating to the other individual can lead to an inaccurate estimate of how
motivated the other individual will be, leading to inaccurate planning of one’s own behavioral response. Two examples are represented here graphically. First
(left), we show that over-estimating how sensitive another will be (f = 0.75) to the true effort (E) leads to a reduction in howmotivated we infer another will be (light
green) compared to their true level of motivation (dark green). Second (right), we show that under-estimating the probability (qP) that another will obtain a benefit
leads to an under-estimation of their motivation (dark green) compared to their actual level of motivation (light green). Such changes illustrate how inaccurate
parameter estimates can lead to misrepresentation of another’s motivation.
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1985; Shadmehr et al., 2010; Schultz, 2006; Wolpert et al.,
2003); a benefit received in a week is valued as worth less than
the same benefit received immediately; (2) the probability (P) of
the benefit being received (if a particular behavior has a low
probability of resulting in the desired benefit, then motivation to
execute that behavior will likely be low and so reaction times
and movement velocities will be slower; Wolpert et al., 2003;
Schultz, 2006; Manohar et al., 2015); and (3) the effort that
must exerted in order to obtain the beneficial outcome (E). This
‘‘effort’’ is determined by the amount of control that must be ex-
erted during the performance of the behavior (Wolpert et al.,
2003). The greater the effort to be exerted, the more the behavior
is devalued (Manohar et al., 2015; Verguts et al., 2015).
This model therefore predicts that activity in the ACCg will be
highest for a highly beneficial behavior for another, which is im-
mediate, has a high probability of being received, and for which
minimal effort needs to be exerted. However, each of these is
weighed by a parameter that dictates how sensitive we believe
another is to these sources of information (k,q,F). That is, how
impulsive someone is (k), how sensitive they are to probability
(q), and how averse they are to effort (F) all dictate howmotivated
they will be. The response of the ACCg therefore depends on
how these sources of information are weighed, as well as the702 Neuron 90, May 18, 2016real delays, probabilities, and effort that another must exert.
Importantly, we do not suggest that these specific characteris-
tics—that define other people’s traits—are necessarily ‘‘stored’’
in the ACCg, merely that when monitoring another’s behavior,
they can influence the valuation another places on a behavior
and how invigorated their actions will be. These parameters
reflect how different individuals may therefore value benefits
differently. Through its connections with other regions that are
important for learning about others’ traits and states, the ACCg
may therefore form part of a network that allows the Vv to be
constantly updated based on howmuch another weighs benefits
against costs.
As outlined in the previous paragraphs, a prediction of how










This equation therefore represents the key properties of the
MoVE, evaluating the costs and benefits of a behavior for
another. As noted in previous sections, activity in the ACCg
has previously been shown to be modulated by all of these fea-
tures and to signal the net value of others’ behaviors.
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Motivation
As highlighted in previous sections, the ACCg signals PEs both
when the outcomes of others’ actions are processed, but
also when monitoring other’s actions. Similarly, two distinct up-
dating signals are crucial for dynamically controlling one’s own
behavior and learning from exogenous feedback (Figure 5B).
At the time of an outcome (feedback) of a behavior, a compari-
son can be made between the actual value of an action and
the expected value of the action. When these are discrepant,
PE signals drive learning based on the magnitude of the error
(Schultz, 2006; Sutton and Barto, 1998). These PEs are scaled
by learning rate parameters that dictate how much is learned
from a PE. The outcomes of others’ actions reveal whether ex-
pectations about the value of a behavior for that individual
were accurate. At the time of the outcome of another’s behavior,
we can compare our expectation about the value of an outcome
of a particular behavior for another to the value of the actual
outcome they receive. When there is a discrepancy, vicarious
outcome PEs (vOPEs) update our expectations of the level of
motivation of another in the future following similar cues in the
environment. That is, if we observe another obtaining a reward
after they have performed an action, having never previously
been rewarded for that behavior, we will come to expect they
will be more motivated to perform the action in the future.
Control theories also postulate another form of PE signal that
occurs during movements. During our own actions, we monitor
their consequences and correct errors in our movements by
identifying discrepancies between expected and actual move-
ment kinematics (Wolpert et al., 2003). During actions we can
also dynamically update our evaluations of others’ motivations
on the basis of the properties of the others’ movements
that are witnessed, such as the speed (vigor) of their movement
(Wolpert et al., 2003). When monitoring another’s behavior, we
can therefore compare our expectation about the value of a
behavior—and an expectation about the vigor of their move-
ment—with the actual behavior we observe. These can therefore
be thought of as ‘‘dynamic’’ PEs as they code for errors during
movements. If the movement is faster than predicted, then the
model increases the estimate of the value the other agent is
placing on behavior (i.e., their motivation is higher than was
expected), whereas the opposite is true when the movement is
slower than predicted. Such discrepancies between the actual
and expected speed of another’s movements are updated by a
vicarious dynamic PE (vDPE) that improves estimates of how
motivated another currently is while executing a behavior.
Crucially, vDPEs and vOPEs can be used to update estimates
of the effort required, as well as the probability of receiving a
reward (Verguts et al., 2015). In the MoVE model, these two
forms of PE update estimates of the value of another’s behavior.
The responses in the ACCg to the value of behaviors for others
and to PEs that were discussed in earlier sections approximate
the signals predicted by the MoVE model (Lockwood et al.,
2015; Apps and Ramnani, 2014; Zhu et al., 2012; Apps et al.,
2012, 2013a, 2015a). This model therefore provides a new
framework for understanding previously identified signals in the
ACCg during social interaction tasks. Notably this model also
has the potential to quantify individual differences in people’sprocessing of the motivation of other individuals. This model
may therefore be able to quantify and provide a mechanistic
understanding of failures to accurately represent the motivation
of others (Figure 5C).
Distinguishing the MoVE Model from Others
Notably, the MoVE model shares commonalities with other
models that have been proposed that can account for strategic
learning and reasoning during social interactions including
models of simulation (Suzuki et al., 2012), strategic inference
(Camerer and Ho, 1998; Christopoulos and King-Casas, 2015;
Hampton et al., 2008) or trust (Behrens et al., 2008). There are
two key differences between these models and the MoVE. First,
thesemodels are predominantly aimed at computing abstract in-
formation about the strategy of others, and how we ourselves
should adapt our strategy to reach goals during social interac-
tions. In the MoVE model, the aim is to account for much lower-
level information about how motivated other people are. Rather
than attempting to explain strategic or theory of mind type infer-
ences, this model makes predictions simply about the value of a
behavior for another individual that allows predictions about the
invigoration of another’s movement to be optimized. Second, in
no previous model has the effort cost to be exerted by another
been included within a model. This is pertinent given the signifi-
cant influence that effort costs have on motivation (Kurzban
et al., 2013; Manohar et al., 2015; Verguts et al., 2015; Apps
et al., 2015b). The MoVE model therefore makes predictions
about a component of social behavior that is not directly consid-
ered or parameterized in any of these models and as highlighted
in other sections have been shown to be tracked in the ACCg.
We note, however, that Behrens and colleagues (2008) did
report activity in the ACCg at the time of the outcomes of deci-
sions that scaled with the volatility (or the current parametric
value of a dynamically changing learning rate) of another’s
advice. While the MoVE model does not directly predict the
response in the ACCg witnessed in that study, it may have
approximated some of what was observed, as in many circum-
stances the two models make similar predictions. Future studies
should therefore use tasks where the properties of the two
models lead them tomake distinct predictions that can be tested
against the response of the ACCg to determine whether volatility
needs to be incorporated into the outcome response present in
the ACCg.
Future Directions
By proposing a new conceptual framework of the contribution
of the ACCg to social cognition, there are a number of potential
avenues of research. From an anatomical perspective, perhaps
the most interesting question is what are the precise locations
ofACCgzonesprocessingother-oriented information. Todate, re-
cordings from the gyrus of the cingulate cortex in macaques have
not extended posterior to the genu of the corpus callosum. In
contrast, neuroimaging studies show activity across the ACCg to
social information in both more posterior and anterior locations.
Future research should therefore examine whether the other-ori-
ented zone of the ACCg lies just in a small circumscribed region
or whether a large portion is concerned with social information.
Moreover, it has recently been shown that in the ACCs outcomes
delivered to different parts of the body evoke activity in differentNeuron 90, May 18, 2016 703
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Reviewzones (Procyk et al., 2016). It would be intriguing to examine
whether a similarly topographic representation of others’ out-
comes is also evident in ACCg. For example, is feedback for
another’sarmmovement, asopposed to feedback for facialmove-
ments, represented in a different portion of the cingulate gyrus.
To fully support the framework we have proposed, it would
also be important to demonstrate that single neurons in the
ACCg respond in a manner predicted by the MoVE model. For
example, it will be important to examine whether neurons in
the ACCg signal PEs relating to the unexpectedness of the
speed of others’ movements and also to the unexpected out-
comes of their actions.
An interesting question, which was beyond the scope of this
Review, is whether different components of computing the value
for others’ behaviors can be tied to distinct neuromodulators.
Past studies suggest dissociable roles for oxytocin, dopamine,
and serotonin in influencing social behavior (Chang et al., 2015;
Crockett et al., 2015). However, future research should examine
the specific influencesof eachof theseon theprocessing of costs
and benefits in the ACCg when they are vicariously processed.
Finally, we believe this model and framework may be more
generally useful for understanding variability in social abilities
such as empathy, cooperation, competition, as well as disorders
of social cognition. Do all disorders of social cognition have def-
icits in processing others’ motivation and, if they do, can they be
parameterized by different components of the MoVE model?
Future work using tasks tailored to understanding how motiva-
tion is tracked during social interactions may be able to tease
apart distinct deficits in different disorders in which there is
ACCg dysfunction.
Conclusions
In summary, researchacrossdifferent species in termsof anatom-
ical connectivity, neuroimaging, and neurophysiology support the
notion that a region in ACCg—adjacent and dorsal to the genu of
the corpus callosum in humans—plays a crucial role in evaluating
the behaviors of others and in estimating others’ level of motiva-
tion. We review the anatomical and functional role of the ACCg
insocial processingandput forwardamechanistic, computational
account of the contributions of the ACCg to social cognition. Our
account predicts many of the responses observed in the ACCg
including those recorded from individual neurons and in neuroi-
maging studies. In addition, the MoVE model is easily generaliz-
able to other domains of complex social behavior in which it is
alsonecessary tounderstandothers’motivation. Looking forward,
this framework may help to characterize and provide a mecha-
nistic understanding of disorders of social cognition, by parame-
terizing potentially dysfunctional components of social behavior.
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